This paper presents the Swiss Ständerat as a model of perfect bicameralism. It looks at the constitutional design of the second Chamber, examines the evolution of the Ständerat and critically assesses its current functioning. The author claims that the Swiss Federal Assembly is still based on almost perfect bicameralism but that the second Chamber only very imperfectly represents the regions. Having highlighted the current role and justification of the second Chamber, the paper will raise the question whether the Ständerat fulfils other useful functions justifying its existence. Does the sheer fact of having two differently composed Chambers prevent capricious and precipitous decision-making? The paper then turns to alternative mechanisms of representing regions at the federal level, briefly looks at other mechanisms available to Cantons to make their voices heard in the capital and presents the House of the Cantons as an evolving third Chamber complementing the Ständerat.
Introduction
It would most likely come to a great surprise to most Swiss that the Council of States, the Ständerat (Conseil des Etats, Consiglio degli Stati), is linked to the notion of perfection in a conference on "Representing Regions, Challenging Bicameralism". The Swiss Council of States, in recent years, has been strongly criticized precisely for its lack of representing the regions, so strongly that few people still think of it as a model of perfection in any possible meaning of the term. This paper is not an attempt to solve the Council of States' identity crisis but will nevertheless defend its existence. If one understands the purpose of a bicameral system solely in representing the regions at the federal level and in safeguarding meaningful participation of the constituent units at the centre, one cannot help but conclude that the Swiss Council of States of today is, at least in part, a failure. Members of the Council of States sit and vote accordingly to party alliances and follow party programs which may or may not converge with the interests of the Cantons. It is only when the interest of one particular Canton or a geographic or linguistic region is at stake, that the members of the second Chamber overcome party politics and favour their Canton or region -but in such a case, the members of the National Council do just the same.
In this paper, I will first present the Swiss Council of States as a model of perfect bicameralism and lay out the main features of the Swiss institutional set-up. For this purpose, I will explore the origins of Swiss bicameralism as an institutional compromise to accommodate the conservatives, the composition of the Federal Assembly and the reform proposals relating to the Ständerat. I will then turn to the main question of the extent to which the Council of States takes the interests of the Cantons or regions into account and 10; Heger 1990: 65). In order to integrate the losing side in the civil war into the new political system, it was deemed necessary to preserve very far-reaching autonomy of the Cantons and to only centralise few matters of utmost importance to the rapidly industrialising state. Hence, the result of the constitution of 1848 was the creation of only a weak central state, and the preservation of strong cantonal independence (Linder and Vatter 2001: 96) . While this vertical power-sharing structure allowed for the peaceful coexistence of communities -still not fully trusting each other, agreeing on the design of federal institutions posed a further challenge. Whereas the larger Cantons with thriving urban centres (the unionists) favoured parliamentary representation based on population size, the smaller rural Cantons (the federalists) insisted on upholding the intergovernmental system of the Federal Diet, characterised by unanimity requirements in most fields and by an equal number of delegates from each Canton acting on cantonal instructions (Pahud de Mortanges 2017: 208; Jaag 1976: 10; Marti 1990: 19) . The conflict was rightly perceived as particularly menacing for the country, as the cleavage between large and small, urban and rural, catholic and protestant Cantons -and winners and losers in the war -largely coincided, and peace and stability was at risk (Linder and Vatter 2001: 96) .
The way out of the controversy was a constitutional transplant: The introduction of the US model of bicameralism, combining a Chamber based on the equal representation of the constituent units with a Chamber based on population and giving both Chambers equal standing (Jaag 1976: 10; Heger 1990: 64-69) .
I Just like the US Senate, the Council of States mirrors the federal structure of the country. It is composed of 46 "representatives of the Cantons" II and stands for the principle "every Canton an equal vote". Just like the US House of Representatives, the National Council ensures a democratic representation of the people based on population size (Vatter 2014: 312) . III The losing side of the Sonderbund, fearing a total loss of sovereignty by means of majoritarian decision-making, had successfully insisted on constraining majoritarianism by creating a second Chamber based on equal representation and endowing it with equal prerogatives (Ebnöther 2017: 125; Bütikofer 2014: 21; Linder and Vatter 2001: 96) .
From the beginning, the Swiss Council of States was seen less as a Chamber representing cantonal interests, than as a major concession to the catholic-conservative
Cantons in curbing democratic majoritarian rule and enabling political cohesion (Heger 1990: 142) . The counter-majoritarian elements introduced by the bicameral system and the requirement of a qualified majority for all constitutional changes ensured an appropriate representation of majority and minority views and conferred on the small cantons -when acting jointly -veto powers over centralizing forces (Ebnöther 2017: 122) . The institutional compromise was not motivated by the need to protect linguistic minorities such as the French-or the Italian-speakers. This was not the salient cleavage of the time.
There was no concern raised about the fact that German-speaking representatives were in a position to easily overrule the French-and Italian-speaking members of parliament; it seemed unlikely that the strongly opposing political camps within the German-speaking community would agree on crucial issues in the foreseeable future.
In the ratification process for the federal constitution, all the French-speaking, and all liberal Cantons opted in favour whereas five German-speaking, rural and conservative
Cantons remained fiercely opposed to it (Marti 1990: 25) . As unanimity would have been required to transform a confederacy into a federal state, the coming into being of the new state was severely flawed. The refusal of several small, rural, catholic, conservative and German-speaking Cantons to join the new state and the rejection of limitations of their sovereignty illustrates the depth of the cleavage and the necessity of considering the losing side's interests. In contrast to other countries, the lack of success of the procedure used to reconcile differences between the Chambers is usually not perceived as a sign of an institutional trap, or a political blind alley. In most cases, the incapacity of the two Chambers to agree is rather seen as demonstrating the fact that the bill at stake did not strike the balance needed to make the deal acceptable to the representatives of the people and the delegates of the Cantons -and therefore should not pass. The willingness to accept institutional blockage and delay is closely linked to the direct-democratic rights of the Swiss people. As 50,000
Providing 46 Seats for 26 Cantons
citizens or any eight Cantons can request an optional referendum on federal acts, the necessity to find acceptable compromises and to negotiate moderate deals acceptable to most political actors involved is obvious to all. If this is not achievable in parliament, the bill is unlikely to succeed at the polls.
The Councillors of State: Cantonal Delegates without Instructions

Appointing the Councillors of State
The bicameral system of the Swiss Federal Assembly reflects the democratic principle E -167 policies initiated and supported than to effective prevention of centralising federal action.
In addition, one has to keep in mind that it is erroneous to assume that all Cantons unequivocally oppose centralisation. This is especially not the case in the Swiss context of strong reliance on the principle of fiscal equivalence, where cantonal competencies weigh heavily on cantonal households regulated by debt brakes, and provide for financial incentives to accede to centralisation, especially for small and resource-poor Cantons. In theory, reforms often claimed to be of marginal importance to rural Cantons, such as immigration, socio-economic and political cooperation and international integration, can fail even though they are supported by 75% of the population. In practice, however, it is fair to say that such blockages challenging the institutional set-up rarely occur. Except for very few exceptions, failed constitutional reform projects have fallen short of majorities of both the people and the Cantons.
The Councillors of State: Actors of Compromise
By establishing a separation of power within the federal legislative branch bicameralism originally served to counterbalance the dominant weight of the liberal Protestants and, more recently, of the densely populated urban Cantons. Like most other second Chambers, the Council of States also fulfils other functions. By delaying federal decision-making processes, it buys room for further reflection and offers the chance to improve law and policy-making. By implementing a procedure of institutional cooperation and mutual checks and balances, bicameralism has allegedly a conflict-diffusing effect and plays a stabilising role (Rhinow: 9).
A bicameral system with two Chambers of equal standing compels the two Councils to negotiate a consensus on political issues. As the majority in both Chambers can effectively exercise veto powers, both shape federal politics (Rhinow: 12). Numerous authors claim that the quality in parliamentary debates and in law-making is considerably enhanced through the common procedure to eliminate differences XXXVII when the two Chambers and cantonal officials to impact on federal decision-making at the early stages and to make their voices heard throughout the decision-making processes, from agenda setting to implementation (Schweizer and Brunner 1998: 64, 65 ).
In addition, cantonal institutions also benefit from the general consultation process during which the Cantons, the political parties and interested groups are invited to express their views on important legislation, other projects of substantial impact and on significant international treaties. XLIII Just like the right of Cantons to participate, the right to be consulted is a decisive power of Cantons and offers ample opportunities to initiate, amend or oppose federal bills. Most importantly, the consultation processes allow Cantons to use soft veto powers, to express dissatisfaction with federal projects and to attempt to stop them. Thanks to the hard power of requesting a referendum -which is available to 50,0000 
Requiring a Double Majority
Similar to the role of the Council of States, the requirement of the double majority for constitutional amendments operates in a way that restrains the democratic principle of the majority in favour of federal considerations. In doing so, it continues to effectively fulfil its historical core function of protecting the less populous and more rural conservative E -173 past 50 years highlights the growing significance that the requirement for the double majority has acquired in recent times (Linder and Vatter 2001: 98) . In 1994, for instance, a constitutional amendment in favour of a simplified naturalisation procedure for young immigrants was rejected by less than 18 per cent of the votes -and failed (Sager and Vatter 2013) .
XLVII While events such as these take a toll on democratic decision-making, it is still important to keep in mind that the requirement of the double majority was established to protect cantonal autonomy and that all nine proposals rejected by a majority of the Cantons were indeed related to an expansion of federal competences (Kley 2014: Art. 142 Cst. No. 10; Aubert and Mahon 2003: Art. 142 Cst. No. 6; Biaggini, 2007, Art. 142 Cst. No. 13 ). In the case of the naturalisation of foreign nationals, for example, legislative powers remain to a considerable extent in the realm of the Cantons, whereas the federal state may only enact minimum requirements in this area (Achermann and von Rütte 2015: Art. 38 No. 33). Even though the double-majority fulfils a counter-majoritarian role, it is not designed in such a way as to confer veto powers on individual Cantons. Unanimity is not a requirement, even for the most fundamental changes, and it is obvious that the Swiss Confederation is confederal by name only and not by fact. This is best illustrated by the point that the establishment of the first federal Constitution in 1848 and both total revisions of 1874 and 1999 were rejected by the five small, predominantly rural and catholic Cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Obwalden and Appenzell Innerrhodenand nevertheless entered into force (Kley 2011).
Observing the Making of a Third Chamber
The Conference of cantonal governments was founded in the wake of the referendum No. 9). This evolution from cantonal independence to cantonal participation is among the reasons why the House of Cantons is evolving into an informal German Bundesrat-style third Chamber.
As mentioned above, it is important to keep in mind that the crucial soft power of 
Conclusions
In granting equal rights and duties to both Chambers of the federal parliament the Swiss bicameral system does not guarantee the representation of cantonal interests at the national level. As the so-called Swiss Confederation is, in realty, a federation, any Canton's delegates can easily be overruled. There are no qualified majority requirements, even for issues of the most crucial relevance for one or several Cantons. As a consequence, Cantons from being dominated by the ever-growing urban centres, more and more distinctly underrepresented in the Council of States. While some voices raise the concern that bicameralism negatively affects democracy and excessively disadvantages highly populated Cantons, others claim that the institutional compromise continues to serve the political cohesion of the country and to effectively deal with the salient rural-urban divide.
As a counter-majoritarian Chamber, the Council of States and its specific features undoubtedly strongly contribute to the consensual model of democracy specific to Switzerland (Rhinow, p. 36). The Swiss system strongly relies on compromise and is fundamentally opposed to the concept of "winner-takes-all"; the Council of States plays a decisive role in entrenching this governance model.
Taken into consideration the functioning of the Council of States and the fact that its members mostly act according to party affiliation, the cantonal institutions depend on alternative mechanisms to represent their interests at the federal level. On the one hand, they rely on the qualified majority required for constitutional amendments and on the possibility of requesting a referendum to oppose federal statutes and international treaties.
The constitutional right of any group of eight Cantons to demand a vote on any federal statute serves as an effective preventive device requiring law-making actors to take cantonal concerns seriously. Cantonal governments therefore play a decisive role in the preparation of federal bills and increasingly often participate in working groups and preparatory committees. In some fields, the loss of cantonal autonomy is therefore rather effectively compensated by increased participation in the capital. The future legitimacy of this complex system will depend on its capacity to guarantee transparency and clear responsibilities, to prevent scapegoating and excessive power-shifts to governments and administrations, thus reducing cantonal parliaments to institutions which merely rubber stamp decisions that have already been taken elsewhere.
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